NOTE
REASSESSMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS:
BLOCKING STATUTES, BALANCING
TESTS, AND TREBLE DAMAGES
I
INTRODUCTION

In the landmark decision of United States v. Aluminum Company of America,'
the Second Circuit 2 held that U.S. courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
antitrust activity committed abroad if it affected, and was intended to affect,
commerce in the United States.3 That decision has become the cornerstone
of enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws abroad.
Since the Alcoa decision in 1945, extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws has caused increasingly serious economic and political problems
for the United States. 4 The extraterritorial application of our antitrust laws is
problematic for several reasons. Only the United States, the European
Economic Community, and the Federal Republic of Germany vigorously
enforce their competition laws against conduct outside their borders. 5
Moreover, only the United States allows recovery of treble damages in private
legal actions seeking to apply antitrust laws to persons acting outside its
borders .6

The conflicting policies among nations regarding their antitrust laws have
led to many international conflicts over the years. 7 These conflicts injure U.S.
foreign relations and hinder the promotion of U.S. foreign policy. In fact,
these conflicts have led to specific reprisals against U.S. government policy,
the most serious of which is the blocking legislation initiated by several
Copyright © 1988 by Law and Contemporary Problems
1. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).

2. The Second Circuit heard the case on certification from the Supreme Court because the
latter lacked a quorum of Justices as the result of disqualifications from the case.
3. 148 F.2d at 443-44. It appears that the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this test in
Matsushita Elec. Industries v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (198 6 ); see also RESTATEMENT
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 415(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1955).
4. Hearings on S. 397 before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1985)
[hereinafter S. 397 Hearings] (statement of James F. Campbell and David Westin, Attorneys, Wilmer,
Cutler and Pickering, Washington, D.C.). S. 397 was reintroduced this term as S. 572.
5. S. 397 Hearings, supra note 4, at 58.
6. Id. at 8.
7. For a discussion of the specific conflicts caused by extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws, see S. 397 Hearings, supra note 4, at 62-68.
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foreign countries. 8 These blocking statutes evidence foreign disdain for
American antitrust laws, and are designed to create a disincentive for the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws. There are two kinds of blocking
statutes: First, there are discovery blocking statutes aimed at preventing
compliance with foreign state requests or orders for documents or
information. Second, there are judgment blocking provisions that declare
unenforceable in whole or in part the decisions or orders of a foreign court
purporting to affect foreign nationals. 9
This note analyzes the practical effects of the blocking statutes on antitrust
litigation and the proposed solutions to the extraterritoriality conflict.
Section II of this note summarizes the provisions of several blocking statutes.
Section III examines two recent antitrust cases in which foreign countries
invoked blocking statutes to impede the litigation. It also summarizes the
views of several renowned litigators who have encountered blocking statutes
in their practices. Section IV analyzes current legislative and governmental
initiatives that propose to revise U.S. antitrust laws in order to accommodate
foreign concerns. Section V posits that the proposed revisions to U.S.
antitrust laws are not likely to lead to parallel movements in other countries to
repeal their blocking legislation. Although these efforts may prompt some
modest modifications in blocking laws and foreign relations, the effects of the
legislation are unlikely to be significant enough to justify changes in U.S.
antitrust policy. Therefore, the note concludes that domestic considerations
alone should motivate changes in U.S. antitrust law.
II
THE BLOCKING LEGISLATION

A.

Perceived Abuses by the United States that Prompted
Blocking Legislation

England, France, Canada, and Australia are among the countries that have
passed blocking legislation at least in part in response to perceived abuses by
the United States in the extraterritorial application of its antitrust laws. These
four countries have passed blocking legislation to protect their domestic
industries from actions by the United States Government and private litigants
in the Uranium Antitrust Litigation.
The Uranium Antitrust Litigation began in the 1970's when the Justice
Department investigated the uranium production industry.' 0 A number of
private suits were also filed. In one private action, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation alleged that uranium producers outside the United States had
formed a cartel that raised the price of uranium so much that it rendered
8. For a discussion of other consequences stemming from conflicting assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, see Small, Managing Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Problems: The United States
Government Approach, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 283, 284-87.
9. See Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction: Extraterritoriality and the
Foreign Blocking Statutes, 28 Loy. L. REV. 213, 214 n.6 (1982).
10. See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., Crim. No. 78-123 (E.D. Pa., filed May 9, 1978).
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performance of its uranium contracts commercially impracticable. II In the
discovery phase of the litigation, Westinghouse attempted to obtain
documents and testimony from foreign producers. These requests prompted
retaliatory responses from foreign nations believing that the Uranium
litigation represented an attempt by the United States to enforce unilaterally
its economic and commercial policies abroad.
Westinghouse attempted to obtain documents and testimony from officials
of Rio Tinto Zinc, Ltd., a British uranium producer named as a defendant. In
2
order to obtain this information, Westinghouse presented letters rogatory'
to the British courts.' 3 When the case reached the House of Lords,' 4 the
British government intervened, positing that British national interests
required denial of the discovery requests.' 5 In response to the Uranium
litigation, Canada passed legislation limiting the extraterritorial reach of
11. Westinghouse alleged that the cartel fixed prices, allocated markets, and boycotted certain
competitors, including Westinghouse.
12. Letters rogatory are legal papers by which a court in one country requests a court in another
country to use its processes to obtain information within its jurisdiction for transmittal to the court of
the requesting country.
13. Westinghouse used the procedures established by the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, openedfor signature Mar. 18, 1980, 23 U.S.T. 2555,
T.I.A.S. No. 7444. At that time, an English statute designed to follow the convention was in place.
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, Ch. 34. See D. Hacking, The Increasing
Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, Address to
the Los Angeles County Bar Association (June 27, 1978), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 155, 166 (J. Griffin ed. 1979).
14. Two lower British courts granted part of the discovery request. See D. Hacking, supra note
13, at 166.
15. [1978] 1 All E.R. 434 (H.L. 1977). One commentator believes that this event was most
responsible for turning British official opinion against American antitrust enforcement. See D.
Hacking, supra note 13, at 167-68.
Other U.S. actions also contributed to the tension between the United States and Great Britain.
The Justice Department's criminal actions against the major North Atlantic shipping companies in
1979 were one source of tension. In these actions, the Justice Department prosecuted several
foreign domestic shipping companies for price fixing outside the regulatory framework established
to monitor shipping conferences. United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Crim. No. 79-00271
(D.D.C. filedJune 1, 1979); United States v. Bates, Crim. No. 79-00272 (D.D.C., filedJune 1, 1979).
The Justice Department charged that the individuals deliberately withheld information about
their dealings from the United States Federal Maritime Commission in order to conceal the
violations. After pleas of nolo contendere by all defendants in 1979 and imposition of $6.1 million fines
against them, the British Trade Secretary indicated that this unilateral action by the United States
would lead the British to reconsider their cooperation with the United States on antitrust matters.
"British Threaten Retaliation Over Shipping Antitrust Judgments," [July-Dec.] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. RlT. (BNA No. 922, at A-30 (july 12, 1979). The subsequent filing of more than thirty
private treble damage complaints further exacerbated the problem. See In re Ocean Shipping
64,585 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (approving $51.4 million
Antitrust Litig., 1982-1 Trade Case (CCH)
settlement of the claims).
Although Great Britain's blocking statute is directed against all foreign authorities, the debates on
the legislation confirm the belief that the British were reacting to encroachments upon British
jurisdiction by the United States. During the debates in the House of Commons, John Nott, the
British Secretary of State for Trade, stated:
In theory, this [attempts by other countries to enforce their commercial policy unilaterally in the
United Kingdom] is a general problem .... In effect, however, the practices to which successive
United Kingdom governments have taken exception have arisen in the case of the United States
of America.

973 Pari. Deb., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1533 (1979). During the debates in the House of Lords, another
British official noted:
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American antitrust law. As an amendment to its own antitrust law, Canada
first passed legislation empowering the Canadian Restrictive Trade Practice

Commission to bar implementation of foreign legal judgments having adverse
effects on competition in Canada. 16 In addition to these provisions, Canada
passed the Uranium Information Security Regulations in 1976.17 These
regulations were specifically aimed at preventing the disclosure of documents
located in Canada to the U.S. grand jury and litigants in the private Uranium
litigation.
In a related action, a U.S. court did not apply the act of state doctrine', to
a French producer who failed to appear and contest the court's jurisdiction.
The French government viewed this action as a rejection of comity principles,
because it allowed the courts of one nation to inquire into the conduct of
those acting under the instruction of another sovereignty.1 9 As a result,
20
France enacted a blocking statute.
[T]he United States has over the last three decades shown a tendency increasingly to try to
mould the international economic and trading world in its own image. This is an attitude not
only of the United States legislature, but it is shared by its courts and its enforcement agencies,
all of whom have contributed to the matters to which we take objection.
40 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th Ser.) 555 (1980).
16. Act of Dec. 15, 1975, Ch. 76, § 31.5, 1975 CAN. STAT. 1535 (amending Combines
Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-23 (1970)).
17. Uranium Information Security Regulations, CAN. CONS. REGs. ch. 366 (1978), as amended
by 115 CAN. GAZ. Part II 3513 (Dec. 12, 1981), issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Control Act,
CAN. REV. STAT. ch. A-19 (1970).

Canada explained the rationale for these regulations as follows:
Canada considered it contrary to her sovereign prerogatives for foreign tribunals to question the
propriety or legality of the actions of Canadian uranium producers that were taken outside the
United States and were required by Canadian law or taken in implementation of Canadian
government policy ....
The Canadian government promulgated the Regulations to serve a vital
national interest, particularly the preservation of Canada's past and future sovereign authority,
to secure compliance with its own laws and policies respecting a vital Canadian natural resource
in the face of assertions of jurisdiction by non-Canadian tribunals.
Amicus curiae filing of the Canadian government, quoted in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gulf Canada Ltd., 19801 Trade Case (CCH) 63,285, at 78,453 (Can. 1980).
18. The act of state doctrine requires a court to abstain from asserting its jurisdiction where to
do so would question the validity of the actions of a foreign state or sovereign. See generally Banco
National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In an action by Westinghouse against a French
uranium producer, the French government took the position that the firm's involvement in the
alleged uranium cartel was under instruction from the appropriate French authorities. The French
government believed that such instruction warranted application of the act of state doctrine. See
Memorandum of Government to France to the United States Department of State (Oct. 27, 1978)
filed in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, June 8, 1979, quoted in Note,
supra note 9, at 262.
19. Memo, supra note 18, quoted in Note, supra note 9, at 263 n.290.
20. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. III. 1979), modified 617 F.2d 1248 (7th
Cir. 1980).
Several other U.S. actions also contributed to passage of the French blocking legislation. First, in
the mid-1970's, the United States Justice Department requested information regarding the activities
of a French airline carrier. See Toms, The French Response to the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States
Antitrust Laws, 15 INr'L LAw. 585, 588 (1981). Second, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act,
which increased the antitrust exposure of foreign air carriers by requiring them to conform to
American concepts of fair competition. Airline Deregulation Act, § 102 (a)(7), 92 Stat. 1705, 1706-07
(1978) (current versions at 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982 & Supp. 1985)); see also Toms, supra, at 588.
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission's attempt to serve document requests on a French company
as part of its investigation of the fiberglass insulation industry also contributed to the problem. FTC
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Finally, the Uranium Antitrust Litigation triggered passage of two pieces of
blocking legislation in Australia, one barring discovery 2 ' and the other
barring the enforcement of foreign judgments. 22 The Australian government
took a strong stand with regard to the U.S. investigation of the uranium
producers because
of the severe effects which a damages judgment may have on the Australian economy,
in such fields as the financing of resources projects, attraction of foreign investment,
trade in uranium and other commodities, and the financial viability of the . . .
companies concerned, all of which
play a major role in the production and export of
23
Australia's natural resources.

Australia enacted its restrictive discovery statute shortly after
Westinghouse presented letters rogatory to the Australian judiciary in an
24
attempt to obtain information about Australian participation in the cartel.
In spite of the restrictive discovery statute, the United States continued its
investigation and attempted to secure more documents located in Australia.
The subsequent refusal of the Australian producers to appear in court led
Australia to fear that U.S. courts might enter default judgments against
Australian companies. To prevent enforcement of these judgments, Australia
passed legislation empowering the Attorney General to issue orders barring
25
the enforcement of foreign antitrust judgments in Australian courts.
B.

The Provisions

Some blocking statutes contain provisions that both block the discovery of
documents located in their countries and bar the enforcement of foreign
judgments. Others concentrate on only one goal. France's blocking statute,
for example, is aimed solely at restricting the discovery of information on
economic, commercial, and technical matters. 26 It prohibits French nationals
from producing documents or information of a commercial nature potentially
27
harmful to the security interests or essential economic interests of France.
The law also prohibits anyone inside or outside of France from requesting
v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding invalid
the FTC's attempt to serve investigatory subpoenas upon a French corporation by registered mail).
21. Foreign Proceeding (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, No. 121 of 1976, as amended by
Foreign Proceeding (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, No. 202 of 1976 (Austl.).
22. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, No. 13 of 1979 (Austl.).
23. Diplomatic Note No. 390/79 from the Australian Embassy to the United States Department
of State, Oct. 19, 1979, at 3, reprinted in Note, supra note 9, at 244 n.177.
24. In re Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contract Litig., No. G.D. 75-23978 (N.S.W. S.
Ct. 1976).
25. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, No. 13 of 1979 (Austl.),
§ 3(2)(c).
26. Law Concerning the Communication of Economic, Commercial, Industrial, Financial or
Technical Documents or Information, Law No. 80-538, 1980J.O. 1799 (July 16, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as French Blocking Law]. A translation of relevant portions of this statute appears in FTC v.
Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1326 nn.146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
This law was an amendment to an already existing blocking statute that prohibited the release of
documents and information relating to the French shipping industry. Law No. 68-678 of July 26,
1968 J.O. 7267. The French passed the latter act in response to an investigation of several French
shipping companies.
27. French Blocking Law, supra note 26, at art. I.
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documents of a commercial nature from a French enterprise. 28 Perhaps the
most interesting feature of the French law is that it is self-executing. Unlike
other foreign blocking statutes, the prohibitions contained in the Act do not
require administrative implementation. 29
30
Great Britain's blocking statute, the Protection of Trading Interests Act,
is an example of the type of statute that both restricts discovery provisions
and bars enforcement of foreign judgments. The Act authorizes the British
Secretary for Trade to block foreign discovery requests when the material
sought is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the ordering country 3 and to
bar enforcement of foreign judgments for multiple damages against British
defendants. 32 It gives the Secretary of State authority over noncompliance
with any foreign requirement or prohibition where appropriate for avoiding
damage to the trading interests of the United Kingdom. 3 3 The Act also has a
clawback provision that allows British companies to recover in British courts
the noncompensatory portion of any foreign multiple damage judgment
entered against them where the judgment was not based exclusively on
conduct occurring within the territory of the country imposing the
34
judgment.
Both Canada and Australia have recently passed far-reaching blocking
statutes. The Canadian Parliament passed the Foreign Extraterritorial
Measures Act in 1984. 3 5 The Act contains a clawback provision similar to that
contained in the British Protection of Trading Interests Act 3 6 and permits the
Canadian government to order Canadian companies not to comply with
foreign regulations. 3 7 It also empowers the Attorney General to issue orders
preventing enforcement in Canada of foreign antitrust judgments 38 and to bar
or restrict the production or disclosure of any records in the possession or
control of a Canadian resident to a foreign court asserting extraterritorial
39
jurisdiction.
28. Id. art. I.
29. Id. art. I; see also Toms, supra note 20, at 592.
30. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [lan.-June] ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 959, at F-i, 2 (Apr. 10, 1980).
31. Id. §2.
32. Id. § 5.
33. Id. § 1.
34. Id. § 6.
35. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Ch. 49, 1984 CAN. STAT. 1867. An earlier bill, the
Foreign Proceedings and Judgments Act, Bill C-41, 32d Parl., Ist Sess. (Can. 1980), was introduced
in 1980 but died when the thirty-first session of the Canadian Parliament ended. It is significant that
the bill was reintroduced in the thirty-second session of Parliament. One Canadian representative
noted that his government viewed the extraterritoriality issue as an ongoing concern, "not as a kneejerk reaction to a special dispute."
"Canadian Government Sponsors Bill to Address
Extraterritoriality Issue," 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1168, at 1106 (June 7, 1984).
36. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, Ch. 49, s 9, 1984 CAN. STAT. 1867.
37. Id. § 5, 1984 CAN. STAT. at 1866-67.
38. Id. § 8, 1984 CAN. STAT. at 1868.

39. Id. § 3, 1984 CAN. STAT. at 1864-65. This provision even applies to documents of a
Canadian national that are located in the United States.
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Australia also passed its new blocking legislation in 1984.40 One section of
the Act goes even further than the clawback provision contained in the British
Protection of Trading Interests Act. It authorizes recovery by an Australian
national of the full amount, not just the noncompensatory portion, of any
foreign treble damages judgment imposed in a foreign country for violating
4
that nation's antitrust laws.
Both Canada and Australia passed blocking legislation despite the
existence of antitrust cooperation agreements with the United States
regarding U.S. antitrust enforcement. Canada's agreement 4 2 requires the
United States to notify

and consult4 3

Canada whenever U.S. antitrust

enforcement efforts affect Canadian interests. 4 4 The United States is also to
use voluntary methods of obtaining documents in Canada before resorting to
compulsory process. 4 5 Furthermore, the United States Government must
participate in private antitrust suits relating to conduct that has become the
subject of notification and consultation if Canada so requests. 46
The mutual assistance agreement with Australia 4 7 is similar to the
Canadian agreement. One significant difference, however, is that it requires
Australia to exercise forbearance in the use of its discovery blocking
legislation. It provides that the mere issuance of legal process in one country
in order to obtain documents in the other does not in itself contravene the
national interests of the other country or give sufficient cause to invoke official
48
measures preventing compliance.
There are several explanations for the passage of these blocking statutes
despite the existence of the antitrust cooperation agreements. First, nothing
in the agreements prevents the United States from using compulsory
discovery processes should circumstances so warrant. In addition, no
provisions bar enforcement of foreign court orders or judgments. Finally, the
agreements cannot resolve the problems stemming from private antitrust
litigation because the government cannot control private treble damages
actions. 49 Thus, until there is a solution to the problem of private treble
40. Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act No. 3 of 1984 (Austl.).
41. Id. § 10.
42. Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America
and Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with Respect to the Application of
National Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1156, at 560 (March
15, 1984).
43. Id. § 2, 47 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at 560.
44. Id. § 4, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at 560-61.
45. Id. § 8, 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at 561. This provision contains a caveat: Either

party to the agreement may resort to compulsory process if the circumstances so warrant.
46. Id. §§ 11 (1), 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. at 562.
47. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, reprinted in 43 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1071, at 36 (July 1, 1982).
48. Id. art. 5.
49. An Australian attorney, speaking at an International Bar Association meeting on antitrust
law, commented that the Australian blocking legislation is designed to force private plaintiffs in the
United States to think twice before drawing an Australian national into treble damages litigation. See
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damages actions, Canada and Australia are likely to apply their blocking
legislation to these types of cases.
Without a solution to the problems created by private suits, it does not
appear that the United States and Great Britain will be able to resolve their
differences either. The United States does not have the partial solution of an
antitrust cooperation agreement with England. Furthermore, the British
recently revealed that they are serious about enforcing the Protection of
Trading Interests Act by invoking its provisions in an antitrust action. 50 The
British take the position that change will be possible only if the United States
accepts the increased interdependence of the western economies and adjusts
51
its economic policies to reflect this change.
Finally, without a solution to the treble damages problem between the
United States and Canada, extraterritorial conflicts will probably remain.
France and the United States have not reached a cooperation agreement, and
one French commentator believes that the French law will be enforced
vigorously with respect to actions brought under U.S. antitrust laws against
52
French parties.
III
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN BLOCKING LEGISLATION ON ANTITRUST
JURISPRUDENCE AND LITIGATION STRATEGY

To date, blocking legislation has only affected two antitrust cases: the
Uranium53 litigation and the Laker Airways 54 litigation. This section analyzes
the impact of blocking legislation in these suits. Because blocking statutes
also affect litigation in the planning stages, this section also assesses the
impact of these statutes on litigation strategy.
A.

Case Law

1. The Uranium Antitrust Litigation.
Westinghouse alleged in a private
action that a cartel existed among both its domestic and foreign competitors
to restrain uranium trade. 55
Foreign governments invoked blocking
legislation to protest requests by Westinghouse for documents belonging to
foreign defendants. Invocation of the blocking statutes by foreign nations
demonstrated foreign hostility toward the exercise of jurisdiction by a U.S.
district court.
"IBA Committee Explores Market Reliance, Blocking, Clawback, Corporate Compliance,"

49

ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1237, at 717 (Oct. 24, 1985).

50. The British invoked this statute in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731
F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Section III of this note, infra, discusses this case at length.
51. 973 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th Ser.) 1538 (1979).
52. Toms, supra note 20, at 606.
53. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. II1. 1979), modified 617 F.2d 1248 (7th
Cir. 1980).
54. 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub noain. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
55. For a summary of the Westinghouse allegations, see supra note 10.
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The jurisdictional issue arose when the twelve foreign producers named in
the Westinghouse complaint failed to respond to judicial summons. Judge
Marshall entered a default judgment against them.5 6 On an interlocutory
appeal to the Seventh Circuit, several foreign governments appearing as amici
curiae argued unsuccessfully that the district court should not have exercised
57
jurisdiction over the defendants because of comity considerations.
As support for this argument, the foreign governments relied on
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 58 and Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp.59 These decisions, from the Third and Ninth Circuits
respectively, employed balancing tests in determining whether to exercise
56. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Il. 1979).
57. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253 (7th Cir. 1980).
58. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). In that case,
Timbertane, a lumber company, attempted to enter the Honduran timber export market through the
acquisition of a failing company. Timberlane alleged that the Bank of America and other creditors
had forced the previous owner's operation into bankruptcy, and then tried to drive Timberlane out
of the country by refusing to settle the debts that Timberlane had assumed. The district court
dismissed the complaint on act of state and jurisdictional grounds.
The Ninth Circuit reversed on both grounds. On the jurisdictional issue, the court could have
reversed the district court based on the effects test of Alcoa. See 1 J. ATwoOD & K. BREWSTER, supra
note 9, at 160. But Judge Choy instead developed a new jurisdictional test that placed some
limitations on the Alcoa approach. He wrote:
The effects test by itself is incomplete because it fails to consider other nations' interest. Nor
does it expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country....
American courts have, in fact, often displayed a regard for comity and the prerogatives of
other nations and considered their interests as well as other parts of the factual circumstances,
even when professing to apply an effects test.
549 F.2d at 611-12 (footnotes omitted).
Judge Choy therefore suggested a three part approach to jurisdictional issues. Id. at 613. The
first step requires the plaintiff to show "some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign
commerce ..
" Id. Under the second step, the court must determine whether the restraint was of
the type and magnitude to be cognizable as a violation of the U.S. antitrust laws. The third step
requires the court to balance American interests against foreign interests in order to determine
whether the American interests are strong enough in relative terms to justify exercising jurisdiction.
Having developed this test, Judge Choy remanded the case to the district court for a factual
determination of whether the exercise of jurisdiction was proper. On remand, the lower court
received extensive evidence and concluded that the dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction was appropriate. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1460
(N.D. Cal. 1983). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that Timberlane had satisfied the first two steps of the
three part approach, but concluded that the foreign interests at stake outweighed American interests
in the transaction. The court concluded that extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law to this
transaction would create "a political conflict with the Honduran government's effort to foster a
particular type of business climate." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F.2d 1378,
1384 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985). The court also concluded that the effect in
Honduras outweighed the effect on the foreign commerce of the United States because Honduran
lumber accounted for, at most, three to four percent of total U.S. imports. Id. at 1385.
59. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). In that case,
Mannington Mills alleged that the patent licensing practices of Congoleum for its embossed vinyl
flooring violated the antitrust laws. Congoleum and Mannington had entered into an agreement in
which Congoleum permitted Mannington to manufacture its licensed products in the United States
for export sale to twenty foreign countries. When Mannington attempted to sell the products in
countries not designated in the agreement, Congoleum sought to revoke Mannington's foreign
licenses. Id. at 1290.
The Third Circuit found that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction, but stressed that the court
must consider competing foreign interests in making its jurisdictional determinations:
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jurisdiction over antitrust cases involving foreign defendants. Both tests,
although slightly different, 60 require the courts to consider whether the
interests of the United States in exercising jurisdiction are sufficiently strong,
"vis-a-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial
6
authority." '
The Seventh Circuit in the Uranium case rejected the argument against the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, holding that the district court had
62
jurisdiction under the "effects" doctrine articulated in the Alcoa decision.
The court stated that it did not find the Timberlane and Mannington Mills
decisions controlling. 63 It also held that the defaulters' refusal to appear
would place the district court in an impossible position if it tried to apply this
64
jurisdictional rule of reason without their participation in discovery.
Meanwhile, Westinghouse's efforts to secure foreign documents under the
control of affiliates of appearing defendants led to a discovery motion in the
district court. 6 5 Several of the defendants invoked foreign nondisclosure laws
as a bar to production. Judge Marshall refused to employ a balancing test that
would consider foreign law before entering an order compelling discovery.
Relying on the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Societe Internationalev.
In a purely domestic situation, the right to a remedy would be clear. When foreign nations are
involved, however, it is unwise to ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and
limitations of judicial power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to
exercise or decline jurisdiction.
Id. at 1296.

60. The Timberlane court considered the following factors:
[T]he degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and
the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by
either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to
harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance
to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
The Mannington Mills court indicated that the balancing process should entail consideration of
these factors:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation and conduct here compared to that abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeabilitv;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to perform
an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign nation
under similar circumstances;
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
61.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
62. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
63. Id. at 1255.
64. Id. at 1256.
65. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Il. 1979).
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Rogers,66 Judge Marshall held that only three factors were relevant to the
court's determination whether to order production:
(1) The importance of the policies underlying the United States statute that forms
the basis for the plaintiff's claims;
(2) the importance of the requested documents in illuminating key elements of the
claim; and
(3)
the degree of flexibility in the foreign nation's applications of nondisclosure
67
laws.

He explicitly rejected the defendants' argument that the court should adopt a
broader balancing of interests approach where a conflict arises with a foreign
nondisclosure law. 6

He further reasoned

that the "judiciary has little

expertise, or perhaps even authority to evaluate the economic and social
policies of a foreign country." 69 Finally, Judge Marshall noted that a
balancing test is inherently unworkable where the competing interests at stake
are totally at odds with each other. He stated:
The competing interests here display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same
plane of national policy. Westinghouse seeks to enforce this nation's antitrust laws...
and to that end has sought documents located in foreign countries where [the
defendants] .. .conduct their business. In specific response to this and other related
litigation in the American courts, three foreign governments have enacted
nondisclosure legislation which is aimed at nullifying the impact of American antitrust
66. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). This decision set standards for whether sanctions should be imposed
for noncompliance with a domestic discovery order despite the interdictions of a foreign
nondisclosure law. In Societe, a Swiss company brought suit under the Trading with the Enemy Act to
recover assets that the United States Government had seized during World War II as enemy-owned
ordered production and then dismissed the suit because of
property. The district court first
plaintiff's failure to produce certain documents, release of which was prohibited by Swiss law. The
Supreme Court reversed dismissal of the suit, suggesting that a crucial factor in deciding whether to
impose sanctions for noncompliance with a discovery order was whether there was a good faith effort
to avoid the limitations of the foreign nondisclosure law. Id. at 208.
However, the Court upheld the validity of the production order. The Court implied that it would
issue a production order if to do so would effectuate strong congressional policies. Moreover, it did
not balance the disclosure policies of the American statute against the secrecy policies of Swiss law,
indicating that the courts need only inquire into the strength of American interests. See id. at 205.
The court also considered whether the documents were crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the
litigation. Finally, the court considered the chances for flexibility in a country's application of its
nondisclosure laws; the greater the flexibility, the greater the likelihood that a production order
would issue. See id. at 205.
1979).
67. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill.
68. The defendants argued that the court should adopt the analysis set forth in section 40(a) of
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Section 40(a) requires that
each state moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction in light of: (a) The vital national
interests of each of the states; (b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon a person; (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state; (d) the nationality of the person; and (e) the extent to which an
enforcement action can be expected to achieve compliance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40(a) (1965).
Several courts have adopted this approach. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (related action in Tenth Circuit in which the
court reversed a contempt order for refusing to produce documents located in Canada relevant to
uranium production in Canada because compliance would be a violation of Canadian law); see also
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968) (affirming judgment of civil
contempt against a bank for failure to produce documents located in Germany pursuant to a
subpoena duces tecum in an antitrust case because American interests in enforcing its competition
laws were of greater weight than German national interests in bank secrecy).
69. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (1979).
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legislation by prohibiting access to those same documents. It is simply impossible
to
70
judicially "balance" these totally contradictory and mutually negating actions.

Hearings on discovery sanctions began in March 1980. Settlement
negotiations began later that year, and Judge Marshall never ruled on the
sanctions. 7 ' judge Marshall's refusal to take account of the blocking statutes
and the impending possibility of discovery sanctions may have been an
impetus for settlement.
The court's unwillingness to take account of blocking legislation in the
Uranium litigation clearly increased tensions between the United States and
foreign nations. For example, as discussed in part II of this note, the
possibility of the entry of default judgments against Australian producers
72
encouraged passage of the Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act in Australia.
Thus, the court's attitude toward the blocking statute had ramifications that
extended far beyond the suit itself.
2. The Laker Airways Litigation.
Blocking legislation initiated in the United
Kingdom 73 had a similar effect on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.74 In that
case, the liquidators of Laker Airways, Ltd. (Laker), a British airline, filed an
antitrust action against several major North Atlantic competitors in federal
district court. 75 Laker alleged that two British airlines, British Airways and
British Caledonian Airways, and six non-British competitors had conspired to
force Laker out of business through predatory pricing agreements.
Laker brought the antitrust suit in the United States because there are no
similar antitrust laws in the United Kingdom. The United States had
jurisdiction over the case because the conduct at issue had substantial effects
within the United States. 76
Four of the defendants, British Airways, British Caledonian Airways, and
two other European airlines, attempted to escape U.S. jurisdiction by seeking
from the British courts an interim injunction restraining Laker from pursuing
its antitrust action in the United States. 77 The British High Court of Justice
initially granted a preliminary injunction against Laker, preventing Laker
from taking "any further steps" to prosecute its U.S. claim against the British
70.

Id.

71. The case was settled in March 1981.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
73. British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.
74. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
75. Laker named as defendants four American corporations (Pan American World Airways,
Trans World Airlines, McDonnell Douglas Corp., and McDonnell Douglas Finance Corp.) as well as
four foreign airlines (British Airways, British Caledonian Airways, Lufthansa, and Swissair). Laker
later commenced a second antitrust action, naming as defendants, KLM, Royal Dutch Airlines, and
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines. Id. at 917-18.
76. The court noted that Laker's principal creditors were American, and that a great percentage
of passengers on North Atlantic air routes are American, so that a predatory pricing scheme would
result in increased fares for U.S. passengers. It also ruled that the United States has a substantial
interest in regulating the conduct of business within the United States. Id. at 924.
77. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 380 (C.A.).
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airlines. 78 This ruling in turn prompted the district court to issue preliminary
injunctions restraining the remaining defendants from taking any actions that
would interfere with the progress of the pending case. 7 9 The Queen's Bench
later refused to grant the British airlines a permanent injunction,8 0 holding
that the district court properly had jurisdiction over the matter and that there
was no ground for English judicial interference. The court reasoned that the
irreparable harm an injunction would cause Laker outweighed any competing
interests.8 ' The airlines appealed this decision.
Meanwhile, the British government issued an order under the Protection
of Trading Interests Act prohibiting the British airlines from producing any
documents located in the United Kingdom for use in Laker's action.8 2 After
reconsidering the motion for an injunction in light of the effect of the
blocking order, the British Court of Appeal permanently enjoined Laker from
proceeding with its antitrust claims against the British defendants. 83 The
court reasoned that because the Protection of Trading Interests Act order
prohibited the airlines from relying on their own commercial documents to
defend themselves against Laker's charges, pursuit of the action could only
84
result in a "total denial of justice" to the British airlines.
In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's grant
of a preliminary injunction restraining KLM and Sabena from seeking British
antisuit injunctions.8 5 In reaching its decision, the court was not intimidated
by the existence of the British blocking order. It especially took exception to
the fact that the order purported to block Laker's use of information located
in the United Kingdom against any defendant, British or American. 8 6 The
court stated:
There is simply no visible reason why the British Executive, followed by the British

courts, should bar Laker's assertion of a legitimate cause of action in the American
courts, except that the British government is intent upon frustrating the antitrust
policies of the American government. The effort of the British therefore is not to see
that justice is done anywhere, either in the United States or British courts, but to

frustrate the enforcement 8of7 American law in American courts against companies
doing business in America.

The court
78.

also

refused

to adopt

the

Timberlane8 8

and Mannington

Id.
79. Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124 (D.D.C. 1983).
80. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.B. 142.
81. Id. at 165-66.
82. The Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Antitrust Measures) Order 1983, S.I. 1983, No.
900. The text of this order is reprinted in British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R.
375, 404-07 (C.A.).
83. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1983] 3 All E.R. 375, 395 (C.A.).
84. Id. at 410.
85. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 940.
87. Id.
88. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes
58, 60.
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Mills8 9 jurisdictional rule of reason analysis to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction. It held that it was incompetent to weigh the purely political
factors involved in the balancing test espoused by those circuits.9 0 The court
also doubted that such a balancing test would promote international comity,
noting that in no instance had a court declined to exercise jurisdiction under
the interest balancing analysis where the U.S. interests at stake were more
than de minimis. It stated: "[C]ourts inherently find it difficult neutrally to
balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national
interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests." 9 '
Finally, the Laker court noted it was improper for federal courts, which are
not "organs . . . of political compromise" 9 2 to defuse a conflict with foreign
law by "jettisoning . . . our [the United States'] jurisdiction.- 9 3 The court

concluded: "[B]oth institutional limitations on the judicial process and
Constitutional restrictions on the exercise of judicial power make it
unacceptable for the Judiciary to seize the political initiative and determine
that legitimate application of American laws must evaporate when challenged
94
by a foreign jurisdiction.Thus, like the Seventh Circuit in the Uranium litigation, the Laker court did
not weigh the existence of a blocking order in its determination to exercise
jurisdiction. The D.C. Circuit's opinion in the Laker case created further
tension between the United States and Great Britain. The British House of
Lords later defused the conflict by reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeal. 9 5 However, the blocking order continued to affect the litigation.
Similar to the pattern of events in the Uranium litigation, settlement
negotiations in the Laker case began shortly after Laker made a broad motion
to compel discovery. 9 6
89. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra notes
59, 60.
90. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949.
91. Id. at 951 and n.156 ("effects were so 'speculative and insubstantial' that 'neither the
Constitution nor the Sherman Act was intended' to reach the challenged conduct" (citing Montreal
Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 870 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982))).
92. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 953.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 954.
95. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 413 (H.L.).
96. Laker moved to compel discovery against defendants British Airways and British Caledonian
Airways on March 27, 1985. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery, Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Soon thereafter, the parties settled the case. Laker
Airways, No. 82-3362 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1985) (stipulation of dismissal).
An earlier decision by Judge Greene hinted that he would not be amenable to an argument that
foreign blocking orders provide a valid defense to nonproduction. Laker had filed a motion to
compel Lufthansa Airlines to produce documents. Lufthansa claimed that it was precluded under its
operating license from producing documents without the approval of the German government.
Judge Greene deferred Laker's motion to compel for thirty days in order to give the parties time to
reach their own agreement. However, in his opinion, Judge Greene admonished Lufthansa for
making bad faith efforts to obtain a waiver from the government so that it could produce the
documents. Laker Airways, No. 82-3363 (D.D.C.June 26, 1984) (order deferring entry of ruling on
plaintiff's motion to compel discovery for an additional 30 days). He also stated that it is not ipsofacto
a defense to a discovery request that foreign law prohibits production, and noted that this defense is
not necessarily valid even at the sanction stage. Laker Airways, order at 4 (citing United States v. Bank
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The Practical Impact of Blocking Legislation on Litigation Strategy

For litigators in private practice, the blocking statutes present many
problems not apparent in the case law itself. These effects surfaced in
interviews conducted with private litigators having expertise in both
international and antitrust law. This section summarizes the results of these
interviews.
Perhaps most obvious, blocking statutes make it more difficult for both
parties to get documents needed for litigation. 9 7 As one commentator noted,
the presence of a blocking statute in litigation leads to a lot of "preliminary

skirmishes" over information. 98 If a foreign defendant is able to anticipate
litigation, the presence of a blocking statute in the defendant's country may
lead him to keep documents out of the United States. 99 It will also encourage
a defendant to bring the case to its government's attention and to seek a
helpful intervention by that government as soon as possible, thereby putting
political pressure on the United States Government to take a position as to the
suit in the United States.10 0
More often than not, however, the defendant wishes to produce the
necessary documents. An ironic and presumably unintended effect of the
blocking statutes is that they often prevent the defendant from producing
documents favorable to his position.' 0 Foreign governments are not likely to
be amenable to their nationals' arguments that favorable material should be
released. This reluctance exists because the sovereign concerns underlying
02
the blocking statutes are unaffected by the particulars of actual litigation.
Blocking statutes have other adverse consequences for foreign defendants.
For example, the defendant is less likely to raise a successful sovereign
compulsion defense to a motion to compel discovery or impose sanctions if
the defendant is operating under a blocking statute that is discretionary in
nature. 0 3 The existence of a blocking order under these conditions exposes
the defendant to an argument that he has procured the blocking order for his
04
own advantage.
The existence of a blocking statute also raises problems for plaintiffs.
While none of the attorneys interviewed felt that a blocking statute would
of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir. 1982), which enforced a subpoena that required production
of documents located in the Bahamas, notwithstanding that compliance would allegedly require
violations of a Bahamian bank secrecy law).
97. E.g., Telephone interview with Sanford Litvack, Partner, Dewey, Ballentine, Bushby, Palmer
& Wood (Feb. 11, 1986).
98. Id.
99. Id. Realistically, however, the defendant is not likely to anticipate the suit. Moreover, some
blocking legislation prohibits production of its national's documents even if those documents are
located in the country where the suit is being brought. See, e.g. Uranium Info. Sec. Regs., CAN. CONS.
REGS., ch. 366 (1978), issued pursuant to the Atomic Energy Control Act, ch. A-19 (1970).
100. Telephone interview with Joseph Griffin, Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius (Feb. 12, 1986).
101. Telephone interview with Joel Davidow, Partner, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, Alexander &
Ferdon (Jan. 12, 1986).
102. See, for example, the explanation behind the Canadian uranium regulations, supra note 16.
103. Joseph Griffin interview, supra note 97.
104. Id.
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discourage plaintiffs from bringing suit, one felt that it might discourage
plaintiffs from pursuing certain kinds of remedies. 0 5 For example, a blocking
statute might discourage a plaintiff from seeking a preliminary injunction.
This disincentive exists because successful preliminary injunction motions
depend on quick discovery. Faced with a blocking statute which will slow
discovery, if not halt it altogether, a judge may be unwilling to grant such a
remedy. 10 6 Moreover, a foreign plaintiff wishing to sue in the United States
must make certain that its government is not going to impose a blocking order
halting production of plaintiff's documents. If the plaintiff fails to do so, he
risks a nonsuit or imposition of sanctions for noncompliance with his
07
country's blocking statute.1
Because of the effect of a blocking statute on litigation, the best strategy
for a U.S. plaintiff suing a foreign defendant is to raise the issue of the
blocking statute early in the litigation. The reasons are twofold. First, the
existence of a blocking statute is a pressure point for defendants. While the
tactic may seem to frustrate the defendant, if in fact a judge feels that a
defendant is "hiding behind" the blocking statute, he may lean toward the
plaintiff early in the litigation. Second, raising the existence of a blocking
statute highlights the possibility of sanctions early.' 0 8
Ironically, while the blocking statutes impact both sides of the litigation,
they seem to present more problems for foreign defendants than for domestic
plaintiffs. Indeed, the blocking statutes may be a major impetus for
settlement. 10 9 This observation is consistent with the results in the Uranium
and Laker Airways cases. 0 Once a judge serves notice that he is about to
impose discovery sanctions, and a defendant is unsuccessful at obtaining a
waiver from his government enabling him to produce the information, a
defendant is likely to settle. Settlement is attractive because the defendant is
in a no-win situation; he will either be subject to discovery sanctions here or
sanctions for violating his own blocking law. I''
The existence of a blocking statute also makes litigation more expensive.
Moreover, most of the attorneys agreed that the blocking statutes seem to be
an effective way of getting the attention of each party's governments. In sum,
the blocking statutes are an effective means of "raising the stakes of the
game." 112
Because blocking statutes have had adverse effects on antitrust litigation in
the United States, the United States has an interest in seeing these blocking
statutes repealed. Blocking statutes create tensions between the United States
105. Telephone interview with James Atwood, Partner, Covington & Burling (Feb. 18, 1986).
106. Id.
107. Telephone interview with Douglas Rosenthal, Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan (Feb.
12, 1986).
108. Sanford Litvack interview, supra note 97.
109. Joseph Griffin interview, supra note 100.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 71, 96.
111. Joseph Griffin interview, supra note 100.
112. Id.
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and the other country whose resident corporation is a defendant in an
antitrust suit brought in the United States. This result is particularly likely in
cases in which the court refuses to factor the existence of a blocking statute
into its decisions." 3 Moreover, the foreign hostility created by U.S. antitrust
decisions can have spillover effects in areas having nothing to do with
antitrust law. Finally, while the executive branch can decrease the likelihood
that a country will implement its blocking legislation through its exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, it cannot control a private litigant's decision to sue.
Foreign nations with blocking legislation also have an incentive to resolve
the extraterritoriality problem. Their own corporations are often adversely
affected by invocation of blocking legislation that is designed to protect them.
The British, for example, have indicated that a "legislative SALT" talk that
would lead to congressional restraints on international antitrust enforcement
might end the "legislative arms race."' '4 It remains to be seen whether an
acceptable congressional solution will precipitate disarmament.
IV
PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY
PROBLEM

Recently, Senator Dennis DiConcini introduced a bill that addresses the
problem of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws. The bill,
Senate Bill 572,"15 attempts to resolve the conflict among the circuits
regarding the proper jurisdictional test in international antitrust cases. More

importantly, the bill represents an attempt by the United States to lessen the
international conflict arising from extraterritorial enforcement of U.S.
competition laws.
Section 102 of the bill requires a court considering a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the motion prior to any
determination on the merits. 1 6 Under this section, a judge would conduct
only discovery or other proceedings related to the motion to dismiss before
considering the substantive issues of the case.'' 7 This provision is designed
to address complaints by other countries that the United States has
113. Rosenthal interview, supra note 107.
114. During the Parliamentary Debates on the British Protection of Trading Interests Act, British
Undersecretary for Trade Tebbit responded as follows to a question of another British official who
feared that the United States might pass legislation authorizing anticlawback injunctions in antitrust
cases:
He asked whether there would be tit-for-tat actions-or hostile ping-pong diplomacy ....
We very much hope not. We trust that the United States authorities will see the dangers of that

and avoid entering a legislative arms race with us. Perhaps they might be prepared to discuss a
legislative SALT agreement at some time and get out of this race.
972 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1590 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Danaher,Anti-AnitrustLaw: The
Clawback and Other Features of the United Kingdom Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 12 LAW & POLY
IN INT'L Bus., 947, 971 & n.147 (1980).
115. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Another article in this issue discusses pending
legislative solutions to the extraterritoriality conflict. See Small, supra note 8, at 300.
116. S. 572, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 102 (1987).
117. Id.
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"unparalleled

provisions for wide-ranging pretrial discovery."'18 Such
provisions, complaining nations argue, permit parties to conduct protracted
discovery unrelated to the merits of the jurisdictional claim even though the
case may ultimately be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.' 19
Section 103 codifies the jurisdictional rule of reason applied in the
Timberlane and Mannington Mills decisions. 120 It requires a judgment
dismissing an antitrust action whenever the rule of reason requires dismissal.
Section 103 also lists six factors that the courts must use in determining
whether to dismiss the action:
(1)

[T]he relative significance, to the violation alleged, of conduct within the United

States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2)

the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the conduct;

(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect United States consumers or
competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the conduct on the

United States as compared with the effects abroad;
(5)

the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by

the action; and
(6) the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies. 121

The bill addresses concerns that the court will be required to weigh
political factors in its balancing test in several ways. First, the balancing test
excludes some obviously political factors contained in other tests. For
example, the bill excludes the Mannington Mills requirement that the court
consider the possible effect on foreign relations ifjurisdiction is exercised. 122
Second, the bill also excludes an examination of the effect of the exercise of
jurisdiction on international commerce, a factor included in an earlier version
of the bill but criticized as requiring a balancing of political factors. Finally,
the bill expressly provides that a court should not consider the effect of
exercising jurisdiction on the foreign political relations of the United

States.

123

Despite these provisions, the bill does not completely prevent the courts
from introducing political factors into their decisions. First, while the sixth
factor appears neutral, it does require political assessments. For a court to
determine the degree of conflict with foreign economic policies, it must assess
what conduct will offend foreign governments. In addition, the six-factor test
118. 131 Cong. Rec. S1162 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1985).
119. Although the bill addresses this problem, it may not fully resolve this issue. The reason is
that facts relating to jurisdiction may be intertwined with those relating to the merits. Therefore,
under the DeConcini scheme, protracted discovery may nevertheless occur. See S. 397 Hearings, supra
note 4, at 16.
120. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1987). The bill also applies the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to antitrust suits. Id. § 104.
121. Id. § 103(a).
122.

Compare Nlannington Mills factor 6, supra note 60.

123.

S. 572, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 103 (1987).

Page 197: Summer 1987]

BLOCKING STATUTES, TESTS, AND DAMAGES

is not exclusive. Therefore, courts are free to weigh other factors into their
24
jurisdictional determinations.
Although the bill envisions that none of the factors will be dispositive of
the jurisdictional issue, some of the factors are arguably inappropriate
considerations for the court. For example, the economic effects of a course of
conduct, rather than the place of that conduct, is the key determinant of an
appropriate exercise of jurisdiction, since conduct that produces no
consequences within U.S. borders causes no damage in the United States.
Therefore, the relative significance of the conduct within the United States
compared with the amount of conduct abroad should be irrelevant.
An earlier version of the bill included an additional jurisdictional
requirement obligating the court to dismiss any action in which the Attorney
General certified to the court that the action would interfere with foreign
relations.1 2 5 This section was criticized, and subsequently deleted, for three
reasons. First, empowering the Attorney General to dismiss a case creates a
separation of powers conflict between the judicial and executive branches,
because the power of dismissal normally rests with the courts. Second, if the
Attorney General refuses to exercise his power of dismissal in a particular
case, his action will undoubtedly cause tension between the United States and
the other government concerned. Finally, granting the Attorney General such
broad powers gives "the appearance that the ability of private litigants to
pursue their legal remedies in the United States courts is subject to political
' 26

manipulation."'

Although this particular provision was fraught with difficulties, the current
bill provides no mechanism by which foreign policy considerations can weigh
into the determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction. 127 This result may
be undesirable because the existence of political problems concerning
jurisdiction created the extraterritoriality conflict. Absent any means to
ensure that political factors weigh into the determination whether to exercise
124. Section 103 states that courts shall rely "primarily on ...the ...factors" enumerated in that
section in making its jurisdictional determinations. An earlier draft of the bill merely stated that
courts shall consider "such factors as" those enumerated in the bill. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 3 (1985). Although this version contains more restrictive language, it still does not make the
balancing test exclusive.
Janusz Ordover points out a further flaw with balancing tests generally. He argues that
"[b]alancing is a rather empty prescription for ascertaining jurisdiction ... unless there exists some
idea of the appropriate weights to be assigned to conflicting interests. Assigning a very low weight to
the genuine interests of the foreign sovereign is a very crude position. In fact, it may provoke
retaliation by the country whose interests have been undervalued." Ordover, Conflicts of Jurisdiction:
Antitrust & Industrial Policy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 165, 177. Senate Bill 572
provides no guidance on the relative weights to be assigned each conflicting interest.
125. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(c) (1985).
126. See Memorandum to Cabinet Councils on Changes in Antitrust Laws, reprinted in 49
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1242, at 946, 951 (1985). The Working Group on
Antitrust Review prepared this memorandum. The group was chaired by representatives of the
Justice and Treasury Departments, with participants from the Office of Management and Budget,
Office of U.S. Trade Representatives, Council of Economic Advisors, White House, and the State,
Commerce, and Labor Departments.
127. The Attorney General does not have the power to dismiss cases, and the court's
jurisdictional balancing test excludes political factors.
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jurisdiction, it is doubtful that any country will find this change to be an
acceptable solution. As the D.C. Circuit recognized in Laker Airways, judicial
inquiry into "neutral" factors leads "to the obvious conclusion that
jurisdiction could be exercised or that there is a conflict, but does not suggest
the best avenue of conflict resolution."'' 28 Absent guidance from the
executive branch, the courts will therefore tend to favor U.S. interests. The
courts will decide disputes based on U.S. law (including substantive antitrust
rules and discovery procedures) despite the existence of substantial foreign
interests in the case.
The bill also provides for a Commission to make recommendations to the
President concerning the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws. The bill
requires the Commission to study:
(1) [T]he extent to which unresolved jurisdictional conflicts (including situations
where foreign laws are applied extraterritorially) impose serious trade barriers, costs,
and uncertainties for United States business;
(2) the principles for setting appropriate limits on the application and enforcement
of U.S. law reaching the overseas conduct of foreigners;
(3) . . . the types of conflicts between the laws and policies of the United States and
other sovereign states that can and should be resolved by diplomacy . . . [or] . . .
litigation in United States or foreign courts or by other legal procedures;
(4) the laws or mechanisms that would be appropriate for removing essentially
diplomatic disputes from adjudication;
(5) changes in the methods of conducting litigation that might better balance the
vindication of valid legal rights with the burdens such litigation imposes in
international commerce and foreign relations; and
(6) the mechanisms or standards that exist, or can be established, either under
United States domestic law or under bilateral or multilateral legal arrangements, for
resolving unavoidable jurisdictional conflicts between the United States and other
29
sovereign states. 1

Establishing a Commission to study the extraterritoriality problem merely
postpones resolution of the conflict. The objective of the Commission is to
examine legislative solutions to the extraterritoriality problem. Since this
problem has been studied extensively by those working on current proposals,
it is unlikely that the Commission will find a solution that is much different
than those that have already been advanced.
A previous version of the DeConcini bill proposed to eliminate the treble
damage remedy in antitrust suits brought against foreign defendants. 3 s 0 This
provision was deleted after the Reagan Administration proposed its own,
more comprehensive, antitrust reform package.' 3 ' Part of the package
proposes to limit the treble damage remedy in antitrust cases to those injuries
sustained by reason of the plaintiff "having been overcharged or underpaid by
any person subject to liability under the antitrust laws for such damages
128. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129. S. 572, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 202 (1987). The title of the Commission would be the
"Javits Commission on the Extraterritorial Application of United States Law." See id. § 202(a).
130. S. 397, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 6 (1985).
131. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The provisions on antitrust reform are contained in
subtitle B of the proposed Trade, Employment, and Production Act of 1987. Because this bill does
not assign weights to each factor in the balancing test, Ordover's criticism of interest balancing
applies to this bill as well. See supra note 124.
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2 The provision applies to all private antitrust suits, including those in
which there is a foreign defendant. Its purpose is to limit the treble damage
remedy to cases in which the defendant has engaged in conduct
According to the
unquestionably detrimental to the economy.
Administration's view, applying the treble damage remedy to other cases
133
punishes potentially procompetitive practices.
The detrebling scheme in the old DeConcini bill might be criticized for
sacrificing domestic antitrust goals in order to appease foreign governments.
That concern is less critical now that the Administration's proposal mandates
across-the-board detrebling. Because detrebling now applies to domestic and
international cases alike, the DeConcini measure on its face does not sacrifice
domestic policy goals in order to achieve international comity. Nevertheless,
the DeConcini bill may result in such a sacrifice anyway. The reason is that it
may make even less sense to eliminate treble damages in international
antitrust cases than to do so in domestic cases. Treble damages provide an
incentive for plaintiffs to detect antitrust violations. 3 4 In international cases,
blocking statutes impede the ability of plaintiffs to prove such violations. This
difficulty may make it desirable to award plaintiffs in international cases a
trebled damage award even if such a remedy is not available in domestic cases.
This argument fails where passage of the detrebling scheme results in
simultaneous decisions by other countries to repeal their blocking statutes or
at least to refrain from invoking them. If domestic policy makers do not
132. Id. § 4113. To provide additional compensation for those plaintiffs eligible to collect only
actual damages, the bill provides that such plaintiffs shall receive prejudgment interest on those
claims, unless the court determines that such an award would be unjust under the circumstances. Id.
§ 4112. Plaintiffs receiving trebled awards, however, would only receive prejudgment interest in
cases in which the defendant acted in bad faith. See id. § 4113.
The rationale for maintaining treble damages in cases in which there is an overcharge or
underpayment is as follows:
Covert concerted practices such as price fixing, bid rigging, divisions of markets, and allocation
of customers must be strongly deterred. Suits brought by victims of these practices, often
customers or small business customers, are generally based on overcharges or underpayments.
Antitrust Remedies Reform: Hearings on S. 2022 and S. 2162 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1986) [hereinafter Antitrust Remedies Reform Hearings] (statement of Douglas
Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Justice Department). Last term, the
Reagan Administration's proposals on antitrust reform were contained in S. 2022 and S. 2162.
133. At the hearings on S. 2162 (reintroduced as S. 539), Ginsburg testified as follows with
respect to the anticompetitive effects of current antitrust laws:
The current punitive damage provisions apply uniformly to all types of practices that may, in
particular circumstances, be found to violate the antitrust laws-no matter how close the
S. 2162
question. In so doing, they have to actually inhibit some procompetitive activities ....
reflects that fact that it simply makes no legal or economic sense for a punitive remedy designed
strongly to deter clearly harmful conduct like price fixing to be applied equally to ordinary, open
business activities that, after a full trial on their economic effects, may or may not be found to
have been anticompetitive.
Antitrust Remedies Reform Hearings, supra note 132, at 31.
134. By encouraging private litigants to detect antitrust violations, the treble damage remedy
furthers the overall social and economic advantages of the antitrust laws. The treble damages
sanction also serves to deter repeated violations and discourage potential violators. Finally, the
threat of treble damages encourages defendants to settle well-founded claims. See Antitrust Remedies
Reform Hearings, supra note 132, at 59 (Statement of Donald Turner, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, Washington, D.C.).
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receive assurances that international comity will result from passage of the
bill, however, the disincentives associated with a detrebling scheme may
damage the U.S. policy of punishing anticompetitive conduct that has direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effects in the United States.' 3 5
In addition to undercutting some policy objectives of U.S. antitrust laws,
there is no guarantee that the Administration's detrebling provision will
appease foreign governments. Foreign countries want the United States to
abolish treble damages in all antitrust cases because they do not enforce
similar competition laws. Under the Administration's bill, however, awards
still will be trebled in some cases, such as in cases of proven price fixing and
bid rigging. 136 Thus, where a foreign defendant is accused of price fixing or
bid rigging, conflict would still remain. For example, in an action related to
that brought by Laker Airways, consumers alleged that the conspiracy among
Laker's competitors caused them to pay higher prices on trans-Atlantic flights.
Even under the Administration's plan, the consumers would have received
137
treble damages had they won after a trial on the merits.
V
THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION ON THE
BLOCKING STATUTES

It is questionable whether codification of the jurisdictional rule of reason
will cause other countries to change their blocking legislation. As discussed
above,138 courts employing the balancing approach have only refrained from
exercising jurisdiction where the U.S. interests at stake were de minimis. Thus,
foreign countries may not consider allowing U.S. judges to weigh U.S.

interests to be much of a concession.
Coupling this balancing approach with detrebling provisions may improve

foreign relations. Without allowing for any executive branch participation,
however, there is no means by which foreign policy concerns can weigh into
jurisdictional disputes.
Even with provisions for executive branch
participation, it is unlikely that these efforts will cause other countries to
consider repealing their blocking legislation. Although the discovery blocking
statutes discussed in this note were enacted in response to the extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws, blocking statutes also represent a general
distaste for U.S. discovery procedures. 13 9 Moreover, although aimed
135. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982).
136. See supra note 132.
137. In re Atlantic Air Travel Antitrust Litig., No. 84-1013 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 30, 1980). This case
was later settled. See In re Atlantic Air Travel Antitrust Litig., No. 84-1013, Memorandum Order
(D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1986).
138. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
139. Unlike the United States, many foreign countries limit pretrial disclosure of documents to
"specifically identified documents in possession of a party"; in addition, many countries "do not
permit pre-trial depositions (except to preserve testimony of persons likely to be unavailable for
trial)." RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 420 reporters'
note (1982) (Tent. Draft No. 3 1982) (international conflict concerning discovery abroad).
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primarily at U.S. antitrust laws, the language of the blocking statutes applies
to all actions. Countries with blocking legislation have applied their statutes
successfully to other types of disputes. For example, the Protection of
Trading Interests Act has been invoked in cases not involving antitrust
violations. 140 In addition, the French blocking statute has prevented the
Securities and Exchange Commission from obtaining third party evidence in
several securities investigations.'41 Perhaps most important, blocking statutes
also represent an assertion of sovereignty. Therefore, their symbolic value
remains even after their practical impact has died. Finally, laws often remain
on the books simply as a result of legislative inertia.
On the other hand, adopting a legislative solution may at least decrease
the use of blocking statutes. In addition, countries like France with automatic
blocking provisions may modify their statutes to make them discretionary.
Moreover, U.S. legislative initiatives may encourage other types of solutions,
including additional antitrust cooperation agreements.
VI
CONCLUSION

The private treble damages remedy in antitrust cases in the United States
has clearly caused conflicts with our trading partners. Invocation of blocking
statutes in antitrust cases has encouraged the United States to reevaluate the
application of its antitrust policies toward conduct abroad. The adverse
impact that blocking legislation has had on nationals of the country
implementing the statutes gives these countries an incentive to resolve the
extraterritoriality problem. If passed, the legislative initiative may improve
foreign relations and decrease use of the blocking statutes, but it is doubtful
that they will inspire other countries to repeal their blocking laws. Moreover,
legislative initiatives that mandate deference to foreign governments on
jurisdictional matters and that limit recovery in most antitrust cases to actual
damages will discourage private U.S. plaintiffs with meritorious claims from
21,819 (Mar. 22, 1983), the U.S.
140. In Alan J. Ridge & Co., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
Commodities Futures Trading Commission ordered Ridge, a coffee trader, to open its records for
inspection so that the Commission could determine whether Ridge was manipulating futures trading
on the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange. The British Secretary for Trade issued an
order under the Protection of Trading Interests Act instructing the British defendant not to comply
with the Commission's request for documents. The Commission therefore held that Ridge violated
reporting provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and prohibited him from trading in any United
States market for one year.
The Protection of Trading Interests Act was invoked again when in 1982 the United States
prohibited any U.S. subsidiaries operating overseas from trading equipment with the Soviet Union
that could be used in construction of the Soviet pipeline. The British issued an order instructing the
companies affected by the U.S. embargo to perform its contracts although performance would violate
the embargo. Protection of Trading Interests (U.S. Reexport Control) Order 1982, S.I. 1982, No.
885, reprinted in 21 IrN'L LEGAL MATERIALS 851, 852 (1982). The United States did not, however,
impose any sanctions on the subsidiaries for noncompliance with the U.S. embargo. See Note, The
Impact of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act of the United States Antitrust Suit Brought By Laker
Airways Against British Airways and British Caledonian, 14 GA. J. INr'L & COMP. L. 181, 191-200 (1984).
141. Telephone interview with Michael Mann, Director, Office of International Assistance,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 10, 1986).
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suing foreign defendants. Given the important policies underlying U.S.
antitrust laws, 14 2 the modest impact the changes are likely to have on foreign
policies may not be worth the potential costs associated with the current
proposals. Domestic concerns should therefore dominate any change in U.S.
1 43
antitrust policy aimed at resolving the extraterritoriality conflict.
POSTSCRIPT

At the time this article went to print, S.539 and S.572 were both in
committee.

142. The Supreme Court once called U.S. antitrust laws the "Magna Carta of free enterprise,"
stating that: "they are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms." United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
143. Ordover suggests an alternative solution to the extraterritoriality conflict. See Ordover, supra
note 124, at 173-77. James Atwood suggests a resolution to jurisdictional conflict over export
cartels. See Atwood, Conflicts ofJurisprudencein the Antitrust Field: The Example of Export Cartels, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 153. Professor Wood criticizes both of these approaches and
offers her own solution. See Wood, Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Antitrust Law: A Comment on Ordover and
Atwood, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 179.

